

# BGP in 2023

Geoff Huston

# A super-brief summary of BGP!

- BGP is the distributed routing protocol that manages the reachability of address prefixes across the Internet
  - Its objective is to distribute to all BGP speakers a current list of reachable address prefixes and the local next-hop interface to use to forward packets to each address prefix
- This is an instance of a Bellman-Ford Distance Vector routing protocol
  - BGP uses a “Path Vector” to prevent loop formation and aid in the comparison of routes

# For example:...

```
bgpd# show ip bgp
```

```
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 203.133.248.2
```

```
Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, = multipath,  
              i internal, r RIB-failure, S Stale, R Removed
```

```
Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete
```

	Network	Next Hop	Metric	LocPrf	Weight	Path
*	1.0.0.0/24	202.12.28.1	0	4777	13335	i
*		203.119.104.2	0	4608	13335	i
*>		203.119.104.1	0	4608	13335	i
*	1.0.4.0/22	202.12.28.1	0	4777	2500 7660 4635 7545 2764 38803	i
*		203.119.104.2	0	4608	1221 2764 38803	i
*>		203.119.104.1	0	4608	1221 2764 38803	i
*	1.0.5.0/24	202.12.28.1	0	4777	2500 7660 4635 7545 2764 38803	i
*>		203.119.104.2	0	4608	1221 2764 38803	i
*		203.119.104.1	0	4608	1221 2764 38803	i
*	1.0.16.0/24	202.12.28.1	0	4777	2516 3356 2519	i
*		203.119.104.2	0	4608	1221 3356 2519	i
*>		203.119.104.1	0	4608	1221 3356 2519	i

# Why look at BGP Tables?

- BGP is one of the few tools that lets us see all of the Internet at once.
- The functional objective of BGP is to flood reachability information for all reachable address prefixes to all BGP speakers
- Which means that looking at BGP tables can be related to looking at the entire Internet!




# The Highlights


- IPv4 Summary
- IPv6 Summary
- FIB Projections
- Churn
- Directions

# 30 Years of Routing the IPv4 Internet

BGP IPv4 RIB Size - RIS and Route Views Peers




# IPv4 in 2023






# IPv4 in 2023

BGP IPv4 RIB Size - RIS and Route Views Peers



# Aside: What happened to TTNET?



# AS Prefix Count over 2023

## Dropped Prefixes

AS Num	Change	Jan-23	Dec-23	Name. CC
AS1291	<b>-5,826</b>	6,183	357	TTNET, TR
AS47331	<b>-2,703</b>	2,811	108	TTNET, TR
AS6849	<b>-1,183</b>	2,251	1,068	UKRTELNET, UA
AS1239	<b>-784</b>	1,204	420	SPRINTLINK, US
AS209	<b>-631</b>	2,343	1,712	CENTURYLINK, US
AS1289	<b>-629</b>	692	63	HOTNET, IL
AS9394	<b>-568</b>	1,052	484	CTT, CN
AS135887	<b>-568</b>	1028	460	Telstra Belong, AU
AS35908	<b>-482</b>	770	288	VPLSNET, US
AS40676	<b>-418</b>	806	388	Psychz, US


## Added Prefixes

AS Num	Change	Jan-23	Dec-23	Name. CC
AS18403	<b>3,034</b>	1,499	4,533	FPT Telecom, VN
AS16509	<b>1,709</b>	7,761	9,470	Amazon-O2, US
AS367	<b>1,403</b>	1,558	2,961	DNIC, US
AS44477	<b>1,376</b>	77	1,453	STARK, GB
AS8151	<b>1,221</b>	1,939	3,160	UNINET, MX
AS3737	<b>1,122</b>	26	1,148	PTD, US
AS140292	<b>1,079</b>	1,258	2,337	China Telecom, Jiangsu, CN
AS207990	<b>1,012</b>	116	1,128	HR, IN
AS9009	<b>857</b>	2,650	3,507	M247, RO
AS4155	<b>846</b>	-	846	USDA-1, US

# 30 Years of IPv4 Advertised Address Span

BGP IPv4 Routed Address Span - RIS and Route Views Peers


This is a view pulled together from each of the routing peers of RouteViews and RIPE RIS






# 2023 in Detail

BGP IPv4 Routed Address Span - RIS and Route Views Peers





# 2023: Assigned vs Recovered Addresses



# 2023: Assigned vs Recovered Addresses




No net “address recovery” occurred across 2023 in IPv4

A total of 18M addresses were withdrawn from the advertised network, and shifted to the unadvertised pool

The net change in the unadvertised pool was an increase of 18M addresses


unadvertised  
delta

allocated  
delta



3.0 advertised  
-18M delta

# 2018-2023: 6 Year Assigned vs Recovered Addresses



# Advertised Span per Origin AS over 2023

## Reduced Advertised Address Span

AS Num	Change	Jan-23	Dec-23	Name. CC
1239	<b>-5,958,912</b>	18,021,376	12,062,464	SPRINTLINK, US
9394	<b>-2,751,232</b>	19,795,968	17,044,736	CTTNET, CN
10455	<b>-2,163,456</b>	4,590,336	2,426,880	LUCENT, US
7018	<b>-2,095,360</b>	98,855,168	96,759,808	ATT-INTERNET4, US
4249	<b>-1,900,544</b>	8,585,216	6,684,672	LILLY-AS, US
47331	<b>-1,550,336</b>	1,687,808	137,472	TTNET, TR
16625	<b>-1,514,496</b>	7,378,432	5,863,936	AKAMAI-AS, US
9105	<b>-1,490,944</b>	2,868,480	1,377,536	TISCALI, GB
15169	<b>-1,236,992</b>	10,250,752	9,013,760	GOOGLE, US
7922	<b>-1,152,512</b>	71,294,720	70,142,208	COMCAST, US

## Increased Advertised Address Span

AS Num	Change	Jan-23	Dec-23	Name, CC
749	<b>17,830,400</b>	207,162,880	224,993,280	DNIC, US
367	<b>9,184,256</b>	6,606,592	15790848	DNIC, US
11003	<b>4,165,888</b>	458,752	4,624,640	PANDG, US
16509	<b>2,304,512</b>	43,574,272	45,878,784	AMAZON-02, US
19901	<b>2,237,696</b>	-	2,237,696	BRSPD, US
3257	<b>2,133,504</b>	4,558,080	6,691,584	GTT, US
6167	<b>1,391,104</b>	11,270,144	12,661,248	CELLCO, US
6306	<b>1,317,888</b>	623,616	1,941,504	TELEFONICA, VE
984	<b>1,180,160</b>	4,352	1,184,512	OWS, US
29447	<b>1,048,576</b>	458,752	1,507,328	Iliad, FR

# What happened in 2023 in V4?

- From the look of the routing growth plots, the growth of the size of the IPv4 network **is slowing down**
- The number of entries in the IPv4 default-free zone reached 920K – 960K by the end of 2023
- The pace of growth of the routing table was slightly lower than the rolling 5-year average, with **20,000 new entries in 2023** (was 36,000 in 2022)
- The AS position was slightly lower with **1,100 new AS's advertised in 2023** (was 1,400 in 2021)
- Transit relationships have not changed materially over 2022 for most networks
- The address range spanned by the advertised route set **declined** in 2023 by the equivalent of 1 /8
- **The overall IPv4 routing growth trends slowed down or even reversed through 2023**

# What happened in 2023 in V4?

- From the look of the routing growth plots, the growth of the size of the network **is slowing down**
- The number of entries in the IPv4 default route set **peaked** by the end of 2023
- The percentage of IPv4 entries in the default route set was slightly lower than the rolling 5-year average in 2023 (was 36,000 in 2021)
- The number of advertised ASes was slightly lower with **1,100 new AS's advertised in 2023** (was 1,100 in 2022)
- Transit relationships have not changed materially over 2022 for most networks
- The address range spanned by the advertised route set **declined** in 2023 by the equivalent of 1 /8
- **The overall IPv4 routing growth trends slowed down or even reversed through 2023**


**Have we reached Peak IPv4?**

# The Highlights

- IPv4 Summary
- **IPv6 Summary**
- FIB Projections
- Churn
- Directions


# The 20-Year View of IPv6

BGP IPv6 RIB Size - RIS and Route Views Peers







# 2023 IPv6 FIB in Detail



# 2023 IPv6 FIB in Detail




# More Specifics in IPv6




45% of all IPv6 prefixes are /48's

# 20-Year IPv6 Advertised Address Span



# IPv6 Advertised Address Span in 2023





# V6 in 2023


- Overall IPv6 Internet growth in terms of BGP is still increasing, and is currently at some **30,000 route entries p.a.** (17%)
  - Predominate use of /48 more specifics
  - 2,000 more AS's advertising IPv6 prefixes
  - Growth of 2,500 /32 equivalents in the advertised address span ( 1.6%)
  - Growth rates across 2023 are lower than 2018 – 2020 annual rates

# The Highlights

- IPv4 Summary
- IPv6 Summary
- **FIB Projections**
- Churn
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# V4 BGP Table Size Predictions

Date	RIB Size	Prediction
Jan 2019	760,000	
2020	814,000	
2021	856,000	
2022	906,000	
2023	942,000	
2024	944,000	949,000
2025		958,000
2026		958,000
2027		947,000
2028		928,000
2029		898,000





# V4 BGP Table Size Predictions

Date RIB Size Prediction

Jan 2019 760,000

2020 814,000

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

958,000


958,000

947,000

928,000


898,000

The best fit projection model to the past 4 years of FIB data is a polynomial function that peaks in 2024 at just under 1M entries



# V6 BGP Table Size Predictions


	Linear	Exponential
Jan 2019	62,000	
2020	79,000	
2021	106,000	
2022	147,000	
2023	172,000	
2024	<b>201,000</b>	198,000
2025		226,000
2026		254,000
2027		282,000
2028		310,000
2029		337,000



Note that the IPv6 tables are 128bits wide – i.e. 4x the size of the IPv4 tables!

# V6 BGP Table Size Predictions

	Linear	Exponential
Jan 2019	62,000	
2020	79,000	
2021	106,000	
2022	141,000	
2023	187,000	
2024	245,000	
2025	310,000	635,000
2026	337,000	822,000
2027		
2028		
2029		



The growth model for IPv6 is highly uncertain today – It looks like a linear growth model matches the most recent 24 months of data

The underlying network growth is lower, and over half of the growth in this model is due to the continued intensive use of /48 more specifics

Note that the IPv6 tables are 128bits wide – i.e. 4x the size of the IPv4 tables!

# BGP Table Growth

**The absolute size of the IPv6 routing table is growing much faster than the IPv4 table**

These two tables will require the same storage/lookup size in around 1 year from now, given that each IPv6 entry is 4 times the bit size of an IPv4 entry

**The good news ...**


As long as we are prepared to live within the technical constraints of the current routing paradigm, the Internet's use of BGP will continue to be viable for some time yet

# The Highlights

- IPv4 FIB Summary
- IPv6 FIB Summary
- FIB Projections
- **Churn**
- Directrions


# IPv4 BGP Updates - Daily Updates

Daily BGP v4 Update Activity for AS131072



# IPv4 BGP Updates - Daily Updates


Daily BGP v4 Update Activity for AS131072



The IPv4 network is surprisingly stable


The number of withdrawals per day has been relatively steady for some 15 years (aside from some increases in 2022/3)

The number of updates per day has been declining through 2023



# IPv4 Unstable Prefixes per Day


BGP v4 Daily Unstable Prefix Count






# IPv4 Unstable Prefixes per Day


BGP v4 Daily Unstable Prefix Count



# IPv4 BGP Convergence Performance



# IPv4 BGP Convergence Performance




# Updates in IPv4 BGP


## **The IPv4 inter-domain routing system is still highly stable**

- The number of updates per instability event and the time to converge to a stable forwarding state has been relatively constant for many years - it rose in 2019 - 2020 and has declined again in 2021, and stabilized in 2022
- 20% of prefixes generate 80% of all updates. Less than 5% of all origin networks are linked to 80% of all updates. **Routing instability is concentrated in a small number of highly unstable cases.**


# V6 BGP Updates




# V6 BGP Updates



# V6 Unstable Prefixes




# V6 Unstable Prefixes






# V6 Convergence Performance




# V6 Convergence Performance



# Updates in IPv6 BGP

## It's improving ...

- Compared to IPv4, the IPv6 network has exhibited a high level of skew of routing instability, where a small number of networks contribute disproportionately to the overall level of BGP updates in IPv6.
- Just 2 AS's generated 50% of the BGP IPv6 update load in the last 2 weeks of 2023. IPv6 routing instability is still concentrated in a small number of pathologically unstable cases.



# The Highlights

- IPv4 FIB Summary
- IPv6 FIB Summary
- FIB Projections
- Churn
- **Directions**

# Directions: Securing Routing

The plan of study in securing the routing system is to:

- Characterize the current behaviour of the Internet's inter-domain routing system
- Understand the bounds of “normal” behavior
- Characterize the ways in which routing information can be manipulated
- Ways to identify anomalous routing information
- Augment the routing environment with means to perform this detection

# Some Open Questions

- Should a useful secured routing system be reactive or preventative?
- In a market-drive economy who pays for security?
- Is the most effective response technical or regulatory?
- Where / how should we respond?
  - Is this a network issue with a network solution?
  - Or should applications protect themselves?
- What is the nature of “trust” in a networked environment?
- How can crypto help?

That's it!

Questions?